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EMPOWERING ANIMALS WITH FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS – THE VULNERABILITY QUESTION
Mari-Ann Susi
ABSTRACT
In the search of applicable methodological tools for analysing the phenomenon of empowering animals with fundamental 
rights, the question of animals as a vulnerable group has received (undeservedly) little attention. Animal rights is an area 
where sociological and legal sciences meet, making it an exemplary interdisciplinary research area. It appears that the question 
of attributing fundamental rights to animals has primarily been studied by legal scholars, who view this as an issue having 
strong ethical and philosophical component. The main legal theoretical approaches to animal rights – such as the welfarist, 
abolitionist and middle-position – avoid focusing on the question of vulnerability. This is probably because vulnerability is a 
sociological and not a legal criterion. What seems missing from today’s global discourse on animal rights is an empirical aspect 
of how the society understands the need for protecting animals. The doctrine of vulnerability may serve as one interdisciplin-
ary tool to analyse the growing attention to animal rights. There are many examples from the history of mankind that demon-
strate how some vulnerable human groups have been deprived of basic rights and subsequently have been gradually provided 
with full recognition of their rights (ethnic and gender minorities, women, people with disabilities). The author is not arguing 
that there is sufficient theoretical or empirical information to consider animals as a vulnerable group. Nor is there a consensus 
about what vulnerability means in legal terms. The author wishes to demonstrate that the matter of vulnerability of animals is 
a research question that needs to be explored in depth, using both sociological and legal methods. 
More broadly, this article shows that the current stage of theoretical analysis of the reasons for animal protection inevitably 
leads to the fundamental rights questions of animals. Conversely to international law, where the ‘nuclear option’ means the 
exclusion or exit of someone1 or something, in the context of animal rights the ‘nuclear option’ means universal acceptance of 
the capability of animals to have fundamental rights, which will substantially change the human rights framework as we know 
it forever. The number of scholars who write about the need for change in theoretical and practical paradigms governing the 
protection of animals is reaching a critical point, which means that this shift is merely a matter of time. Recognising theoreti-
cally that at least some animals have at least some fundamental rights, and then proceeding to this recognition in soft and hard 
international law is inevitable, if my proposition of a paradigmatic change either on the horizon or already ongoing is correct. 
As we will see below, during the short academic “excursion”, when exploring diverse replies to the question of whether animals 
have or should have fundamental rights, these replies all take a position on whether fundamental rights for animals can be jus-
tified. The question about justification of human rights is nothing new. Robert Alexy has written that the existence of human 
rights depends on their justifiability and on nothing else.2 What is justifiable is correct, according to Alexy. Once we can justify 
why animals should have fundamental rights, then at the same time we can have an argument of correctness requiring the 
global community to recognise that animals have fundamental rights. This, of course, will depend on whether fundamental 
rights for animals are justifiable.
1  For example, a dissatisfied country exiting an international organisation or dissatisfied member states deciding to “close” down an 
international court.
2  Robert Alexy, “The Existence of Human Rights”, in: Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, supplementary volume 136 
(2013), 11.
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INTRODUCTION
The study of animal rights is an area where sociology and law meet. On the one hand, the debates around the possibility 
of recognising animals as a distinct group having certain rights – even fundamental rights – depends on how the society 
understands the need for such recognition. This is a sociological question, focusing on how social understandings are 
“translated” into legal norms. One can argue that without social acceptance of the need to recognise animals as having 
rights, law would not be able to achieve one of its goals – that is to turn social norms into legal norms. On the one hand, 
lawyers and legal scholars are not certain which approach is most suitable for meeting the heightened social awareness of 
the need of protecting animals. It appears that the usage and combination of both sociological and legal methods may be 
an answer to understanding why there is a growing need to speak about protecting animals, and which legal avenues are 
most suitable to achieve this goal.
Current scholarly debates around animal rights have not produced a consensual approach to some of the fundamental 
questions concerning this relatively new branch of law and legal research, such as the distinction between animal law 
and the legal regulation of animal welfare protection. A fundamental question within the discourse about animal rights is 
whether these rights are protected because humans recognise that animals (or at least some animals) have certain unalien-
able rights, or in alternative, because the protection of animals is part of protecting the fundamental rights (of humans) for 
sustainable environment and/or diversity of the habitat. Scholars are also debating whether animals are a vulnerable group 
and whether there are similarities in the social attitudes within the dynamic evolution of modern society towards the vari-
ous vulnerable groups and now also towards animals. 
There are some theoretical premises which seem to be accepted by a majority of authors. Both the social and legal scholars, 
the animal welfare activist communities and policy-makers at domestic and global levels seem to agree that animal welfare 
has become a global concern. There is increasing evidence that the civil society is aware of the need to recognise at the very 
least that animals deserve protection3. This conceptual agreement seems to disappear when the next question is asked – 
what should be the appropriate response via legal regulation, e.g. global vs regional vs domestic to achieving the goal of the 
protection of animals? Is it sufficient to rely on social norms, or is legal regulation unavoidable? A sociologist might argue 
that if the lawyers cannot agree on the ways in which to legally protect animals, then social norms may be sufficient. A law-
yer, in turn, might reply that law can respond only when there is social consensus on which animals and to what extent need 
to be protected. Be as it may, since animals are used globally for various purposes (mainly economic, but also scientific and 
for providing enjoyment), social and legal norms must also respond globally. Therefore, across cultures there is a need for 
agreeing upon certain minimum standards of animal protection. The claim that certain standards of protection are needed 
may be agreed upon, irrespective of the question of whether one believes that animals have rights. 
This paper will now briefly outline the main theoretical approaches to animal law and the question whether animals should/
could have fundamental rights. The author will also add to each main approach presented a reflection on whether the idea 
of vulnerability of animals as a distinct group might fit into the respective argumentation. The question of animal protec-
tion and animal rights involves ethical, economical, philosophical, sociological and legal components.
The author will especially explore the applicability of the concept of vulnerability in understanding why the question of 
3  Several powerful global organisations have emerged with the goal or promoting world-wide understanding of the need to protect ani-
mals – see the World Society for the Protection of Animals (WSPA), the Animal Welfare Movement, but also the EU platform on animal 
welfare. See also scholarly discussion about the role of the civil society in fostering the understanding of the need to protect animals 
- International Handbook of Animal Abuse and Cruelty: Theory, Research, and Application (New Directions in the Human-Animal 
Bond), edited by Frank A. Ascione, Purdue University Press 2010.
78
animal rights is increasingly in the agenda of political and social debates, leading to the search of an appropriate legal 
response. Yoriko Otomo from the University of London has studied how emerging patters of economic interdependence 
have changed representations of women and animals4. It appears that the approach of viewing animals as a vulnerable 
group is not entirely new, although the majority of scholars do not explore this theoretical avenue. Even if, at the outset, 
the comparison of animals to a vulnerable group may be rejected as fundamentally unsound, at a closer look this approach 
deserves attention. It will be important to analyse the pros and cons of the concept of vulnerability and try to come closer 
to an understanding of whether this concept is an applicable instrument to the gradual recognition of the fundamental 
rights of animals. If there is ever to be a consensus among legal scholars, interest groups and global policy-makers that 
the concept of vulnerability is a theoretical pillar for developing animal rights law, this will inevitably lead to far-reaching 
consequences both in the legal protection of animals and in how the society understands animal rights. Martha Fineman, 
one of the globally known proponents of the vulnerability doctrine in human rights law, has written that acceptance of a 
vulnerability approach towards some specific legal issue is likely to lead to a paradigmatic change in the way in which the 
society addresses existing material and social inequalities5. Under the fundamental rights of animals, the author only has a 
limited number of fundamental rights in mind, which are recognised via various international instruments for humans – 
such as the right to food and water; the right not to be tortured; the right to be protected from disease and pain; the right 
to express normal behaviour; and the right not to be subject to fear and distress.
THEORIES
There are three main theoretical approaches, which address the question of why animals deserve legal protection.
First, there is the “welfarist” position, which argues that animals are protected not because they have rights, but because 
of the need to avoid unnecessary suffering6. Within this approach, the question of whether animals have rights has been 
of marginal interest, dominantly as a matter of theoretical or philosophical abstraction. Animal welfare emerged as a sci-
entific concept, based on the presumptions that humans are bound by certain moral restraints when dealing with animals. 
The ethical component has not disappeared with the entry of the suggestion that animals have rights, but rather it has 
transformed into strengthening animal protection and adding a global aspiration, at least from the perspective of animal 
protection activist groups. According to this theory, animals should not be subject to suffering, but at the same time they 
have no right to life within the meaning as humans have the absolute right to life. The welfarism theory does not operate 
with the idea that animals have rights, but is based on the unchallenged idea that animals are property, albeit a special kind 
of property. The question of whether animals are to be viewed as a distinct vulnerable group seems to not have any purpose 
within this approach, since the idea of granting animals fundamental rights is excluded. Animals need to be protected be-
cause we as humans have moral obligations – therefore, this is predominantly a sociological question.
Second, in contrast to welfarism, the “abolitionist” theory argues that animals should be given certain rights, whereas the 
first right to be given is the absolute right not to be property. Although first introduced already in 1983 in the Western legal 
4  Otomo, Yoriko and Mussawir , Edward, eds. (2012) Law and the Question of the Animal: A Critical Jurisprudence. Abingdon; New 
York: Routledge. (Law, Justice and Ecology)
5  Fineman uses the ‘paradigm’ language as follows, ”A vulnerability approach accomplishes several other important political objectives 
that illuminate both why a post-identity paradigm is necessary and how powerful it can be in addressing existing material and social 
inequalities” - Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 2o Yale J.L. and Femi-
nism 1, 2008 – 2009, at 17
6  Robert Garner, A Defense of a Broad Animal Protectionism, in: Gary Francione and Robert Garner, The Animal Rights Debate: Ab-
olition or Regulation? New York 2013, 129
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discourse by Tom Regan, the idea of animals having rights has mainly stayed as a theoretical construct without practical 
“translation” into binding legal obligations. The term “abolitionism” in this context refers mainly to the need to abolish 
the exploitation of animals. This theoretical position seems radical (stigmatised by a situation of a monkey escaping from 
the zoo and shouting “freedom!”), which is difficult to realise in the modern economy. The scope of the abolitionist idea 
depends on the content of rights that one is ready to ascribe to animals, as well as criteria of such ascription.  The “aboli-
tionist” position argues that animals shall not only be treated humanely, but they should also be accorded rights or at least 
a few. This position has been advocated by Francione since the 1990s, and it leads to a logical conclusion that any modern 
commercial handling of animals needs to be abolished7. The question of animals as a distinct vulnerable group becomes 
irrelevant as well, but for an entirely different reason than with the first theoretical approach. Since the abolitionist position 
is already based on the recognition that animals have some fundamental rights, the concept of a vulnerable group is not 
needed to “make the argument”.
Third, there is also a “middle position”, which argues that “animals are not autonomous, self-governing agents with the 
power to frame, revise, and pursue their own conceptions of the good and so do not have a fundamental interest in liberty. 
As such, animals have compelling rights that impose strict limitations on what we may permissibly do to them in a range of 
contexts. However, animals have no general right never to be used, owned, or exploited by human beings.8” Again, it seems 
that the discussion on whether animals can be viewed as a vulnerable group, to which in the future may be extended some 
fundamental rights, does not seem to be a suitable logical consequence of this line of thought.
However, a pattern still emerges from these considerations, indicating that there is a need for some fundamental change 
in the way in which human society thinks about animals in reference to their legal rights and status9. It seems, however, 
that the presumption of this call for a fundamental change may not yet be supported by empirical evidence. If lawyers are 
arguing that there is a need for a change, it does not necessarily mean that they have realised a social need for this change.
A philosophical aspect of this debate is whether the extension of a right to a right-holder is conditional upon this right-hold-
er being aware that he/she/it holds the right? An affirmative answer would run contrary to the contemporary human rights 
discourse and main human rights protection instruments. If then a person can have rights without being aware of them, it 
means that the entitlement to some rights (at least some absolute fundamental rights) is not dependent on the will of the 
entitled person to actively enjoy these rights. Vulnerable groups like children, the elderly, and mentally disabled persons 
are the main groups that can be given as an illustration to this line of thinking. The following doctrine from the previous is 
that the divide between someone enjoying a right vis-à-vis the obligation of others to protect and respect this right does not 
depend on the conscious understanding on behalf of the right-holder that he/she/it has the right. Obligated persons would 
still have the obligation to respect and protect the rights of the vulnerable groups. From here, we are very close to describing 
the theoretical basis for recognising animal rights – animals as a vulnerable group have certain rights without the element 
of being aware of those rights, whereas there are obligations of third parties to recognise and protect these rights. In the 
view of the author of this article, this philosophical aspect – there is no morally valid argument to condition that a human 
rights holder should be aware of him/her holding these rights – should be one of the cornerstones for analysing the future 
of animal rights law.
7  Gary Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law, Philadelphia 1995
8  Alasdair Cochrane, Animal Rights without Liberation: Applied Ethics and Human Obligations; New York 2012, p 210
9  There is an emerging trend in literature to question whether the animal rights movement and animal protection doctrines are another 
attempt by Western countries to impose their own views and ethical understandings upon the rest of the world. For example, the stan-
dards advocated by the animal protectionists run counter to the practice of some indigenous people of whale hunting, or against the 
Muslim practice of animal slaughter. Therefore, it cannot be denied that certain cultural traditions may hinder the overall acceptance 
of the idea that animal have rights and deserve protection at least regarding some absolute rights. 
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Neither the practice of international (regional) courts, nor the international legal instruments view animals as a distinct 
vulnerable group, which may be entitled to fundamental rights protection. It appears that the issue is perhaps not so much 
that this concept has been rejected as a result of some comprehensive debate, but because there is a lack of consensual ap-
proaches to the animal rights protection as such, so the variety of conceptual approaches is not an issue. 
The shift in the understanding of the human-animal divide may be far-reaching. It is argued that animal welfare legislation 
(including at the EU level, for example, the EU regime on the protection of animals in laboratory conditions – Directive 
2010/63/EU) contains a fundamental bias for favouring the interests of humans over the interests of animals. This bias in-
fluences law- and policy-making, and there is a clear economic component. However, should it be recognised that animals 
have certain rights, then it becomes difficult to argue for the preponderance of human interests and rights over animal 
interests and rights. At the same time, there seems to be some evidence that characteristics which for a long time have been 
viewed as characteristic to humans only may also be attributable to some animals (not all at the same time) – for example, 
the ability to make tools, learn, express themselves, show compassion. Modern science argues that there is no clear line 
to divide humans from animals and the relationship is the one of a continuum. Should this be the case, then there is no 
ground to argue that certain social phenomena, like moral values, social and legal norms and rights can only be applied to 
the human society.
Although European countries have established regulations both at domestic and regional levels (through the EU and the 
Council of Europe) for certain norms to protect animals10, there appears no consensual approach as to the foundations of 
the legislation. Nor have the regional courts any significant case law, which would address the fundamental question of why 
animals are protected11. In an article dealing with the question about the paradigmatic changes in animal law, Anne Peters 
has reported that “the protection of endangered species, habitat protection, and biological diversity, have been addressed 
on a global level, but not the welfare of animals, let alone their rights”12.
The Inter-American Court has perhaps used the concept of vulnerability more frequently than the European Court of 
Human Rights. When analysing the Inter-American Court’s approach to the doctrine of vulnerability, Ludovic Hennebel 
has shown that the Court systematically deduces a special need for protection tailored according to the vulnerabilities of 
certain groups, which are particularly targeted, and then protects their “best interests”13. The best interests approach has 
certain similarities to the capabilities approach developed by Martha Nussbaum and described later in this article. It is suf-
ficient to note at this point that perhaps the approach to analyse animal rights from the perspective of their own capabilities 
and interests is universal and not limited to specific academic circles.
Be as it may, it can be concluded that the current legislative efforts globally and regionally are unable to reach the funda-
mental rights approach to animals without first arriving at a scholarly consensus that animals have fundamental rights in 
10  For example, there are norms to regulate the keeping of farmed animals, the transport and slaughter of animals and the keeping of 
pets – see the Convention for the Protection of Animals kept for Farming Purposes, Additional Protocol for the Protection of Animals 
during International Transportation (ETS No. 193); Convention for the Protection of Animals for Slaughter, Convention for the Pro-
tection of Pet Animals
11  The European Court of Human Rights so far has no cases dealing with the rights of animals. There are cases which have dealt with the 
right to privacy under ECHR article 8 in connection with affection to an animal. The judgment in Cha-are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, 
no 27417/95, judgment of 27 June 2000, concerned the slaughter of ritual animals. No issues of animal rights emerged in this case.
12  Anne Peters, Introduction: Animal Law- A Paradigm Change, Animal Law: Reform or Revolution?, Anne Peters, Saskia Stucki, Livia 
Boscardin (editors), Schulthess 2015, p 18
13  Ludovic Hennebel, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: the Ambassador of Universalism, Quebec Journal of International 
Law (Special Edition) 2011, p 64
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need of protection. A topic which will remain unexplored in this article is whether a full or nearly consensual position of 
some relevant stakeholders, such as the business sector processing animal products, is needed to bring about a fundamental 
change in recognising animal fundamental rights.
The question about the need of a fundamental shift in the legal protection of animals
It can be argued that ongoing reforms of animal legislation have not improved the situation of animals, but on the contrary, 
have continuously reinforced the property status of animals and thereby increased their exploitation and suffering. The 
recent welfare reforms are, thus, viewed as counterproductive because their goal is simply to quiet the moral discomfort of 
humans when confronted with the slaughter and exploitation of animals14. It is argued that isolated welfare norms remain 
incidental in international legal regimes, which formulate as their primary objective the regulation of harvesting and trad-
ing animals, their conservation and protection of global biodiversity. This has led some authors to write about the non-ex-
istence of a transnational animal protection regime (C. Otter15), a lack of a coherent legal regime (S. White16), and a lack 
of consistent attention from the international community (Bowman17). On the other hand, there seems to be an increased 
interest from lawmakers to pay attention to animal welfare. 
Anne Peters is a proponent of the view that animal law and accompanying legal scholarship is capable and in need of a 
revolution comparable to a transition to a new paradigm18. This is because we are becoming more and more aware19 that 
something has gone fundamentally wrong in how we have so far understood the matter of the protection of animals.
One can argue that the failure to give a greater emphasis to the human rights approach regarding certain socially pressing 
issues is indicative of the uncertainty and debate about the proper place and approach of human rights law towards the 
respective issue20. This does not mean that there is a denial of the need to recognise such right, but simply that the “birth 
process” of universal recognition of some right is difficult and may mean a paradigmatic change.
It seems that the current human rights theory is challenging the traditional understandings of the right to privacy. Within 
these debates, certain new doctrinal approaches are being proposed and argued, which have the potential of assuming an 
overarching effect on how to understand the notion of privacy, not only limited to humans as the primary bearers of human 
rights entitlements, but also reaching out to other species.
14  Gary Francione and Anna Charlton, Animal Law: A Proposal for a New Direction, Animal Law: Reform or Revolution?, Anne Peters, 
Saskia Stucki, Livia Boscardin (editors), Schulthess 2015, p 18
15  C. Otter, S. O’Sullivan and S. Ross, ‘Laying the Foundations for an International Animal Protection Regime’ (2012) 2 (1) Journal of 
Animal Ethics, pp 53 – 72
16  S. White, ‘Into the Void: International Law and the Protection of Animal Welfare’ (2013) 4 (4) Global Policy, pp 391 - 398
17  M. Bowman, P. Davies and C. Redgwell, Lyster’’s International Wildlife Law, 2nd edition (Cambridge University Press 2011)
18  A doctrinal question is also, whether by extending (some) rights to (some) animals, the overall level of fundamental rights protection 
globally would weaken. This is the observation that if all rights are fundamental rights, what is their meaning? 
19  Anne Peters, Reform or Revolution, pp 25 – 26
20  Dinah Shelton, What Happened in Rio to Human Rights?, Yearbook of International Environmental Law (1992), 82
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One of the relatively new doctrines addressing the issue of privacy is the theory of contextual integrity, which is based on 
the idea of the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’21 and articulates an ‘alternative account of privacy’22. The contextual in-
tegrity theory is developed by the American scholar Hellen Nissenbaum and has as one of its fundamental building-blocks 
the idea that the understanding of privacy is based on ethical conceptions that evolve over the course of time. In other 
words, what may have been seen as falling outside of the notion of privacy, may no longer be so due to the development 
of the modern society. Privacy is a different category than just “being left alone”. In the view of the author of this article, as 
soon as someone uses “human rights privacy language” in the context of an animal, for example, saying “give my cat some 
privacy” instead of saying “leave my cat alone”, there is an implication that this cat is viewed by the owner as having human 
rights. 
The author of this paper finds, based on the considerations outlined above, that the aspect of animals as a vulnerable 
group within the debate about the need to grant animals certain fundamental rights so far has not received enough at-
tention. Although the vulnerable group argument does not seem decisive in any of the theoretical approaches, it may well 
complement the aspect where it is asked whether there are good reasons not to grant (some) animals (some) fundamental 
rights. This seems to be a situation, where sociological methods may provide an answer. If there is empirical evidence of 
social dynamics in recognising that some animals should be given fundamental rights, it may be difficult for the legal and 
political establishment to ignore this aspect. However, this question has not been studied comprehensively.
The main research question, as outlined above, is whether there is some similarity in the dynamics of social attitudes and 
the gradual legal recognition of the rights of vulnerable groups in the past with animal rights. This is not an entirely novel 
question, since in the academic debate some authors have pointed to the similarities of the current attitudes towards ani-
mals with the former attitudes towards some vulnerable groups. 
Anne Peters has shown that as late as from 1879-1935 the Zoo in Basel organised so-called “peoples’ shows”, where those 
displayed (in captivity in cells) were non-Europeans in traditional clothing, who performed folkloristic dances and hand-
crafts.23 She argues that these non-European people were not given any rights because they were viewed as morally inferior 
and incapable of taking care of themselves. Similar social attitudes can be seen from the discrimination of women and 
mentally ill individuals across the development of history. Current human rights practice is also addressing the matter of 
the vulnerability of prisoners and the question to what extent rights can be limited. Is there some similarity between the 
historical attitudes towards the vulnerable groups and the way in which contemporary society views animals from the 
perspective of whether they should be given some “fundamental rights”? It can be argued that implied speciesism is com-
parable to racism, or at least to discrimination with no just cause24. 
Comparison of social attitudes and expressions used towards vulnerable groups is a methodological challenge. When the 
hypothesis can be verified that animals are understood in the contemporary society as a vulnerable group, comparable 
21  R. Bellanova, ‘Waiting for the barbarians or shaping new societies? A review of Helen Nissenbaum’s “Privacy In Context”, Stanford 
University Press, 2010)’, (2011) 16 Information Polity: an international journal on the development, adoption, use and effects of infor-
mation technology 391, 393; and T. Wong, ‘Helen Nissenbaum’s Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life 
(2010)’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 957, 965
22  H. Nissenbaum, ‘Privacy as Contextual Integrity”, (2004) 79 Washington Law Review 101, 124
23  A. Peters, ‘Introduction: Animal Law – A Paradigm Change’ see in literature review: A. Peters, S. Stucki, L. Boscardin, editors, see in 
literature overview, p 17 – 18
24  A radical statement belongs to Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela, who compares the international treatment of animals to “global slaugh-
terhouse”.
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to the way that human society in the past has defined certain vulnerable groups, then the logical development is that the 
overall recognition of animals having rights is not a matter of if, but matter of when. However, this conclusion only holds 
firm when one takes the position that there is no insurmountable watershed between humans and non-humans, which 
would make it impossible to even speak of extending human or fundamental rights to animals. This might even preclude 
extending to animals the handful of fundamental rights mentioned beforehand25.
In order to verify the proposition of whether animals can be viewed as a distinct group, which may be subject to the ben-
efit of progressive interpretation of human rights development, we have to look at whether there is any non-legal evidence 
regarding the possible dividing line between humans and animals. This search of the criteria allows to answer the question 
of whether it is a mission impossible to apply the same elements of legal dynamics to animals as towards other vulnerable 
social groups in the past. There appear two main lines of argumentation. One is arguing that humans are a unique group, 
sealed off from other living beings. The other is arguing that the dividing line between humans and animals is becoming 
more and more unclear, as the characteristics which for a long time were considered to be applicable only to humans also 
apply to some animals26. Based on the current scientific evidence, the author concludes that the argument about the possi-
ble insurmountable dividing line between humans and animals is primarily moral or legal and not biological. 
Doctrines focusing primarily on the aspect of fundamental rights without reference to vulnerability
Before exploring the question of vulnerability further, the author asks whether there are currently specific doctrines, within 
the main theoretical approaches outlined above, that primarily focus on the question of extending or denying fundamental 
rights to animals without using the concept of vulnerability. Are there doctrines which per se exclude the possibility of an-
imals ever being granted some fundamental rights, and if so, how do these doctrines relate to the concept of vulnerability? 
And then, if there are doctrines which consider the possibility of granting animals some fundamental rights, even theo-
retically, does it mean that the human rights language27 used indicates similar dynamics to those that have occurred when 
other vulnerable groups have been gradually granted the full spectrum of fundamental rights?
A related scientific question is: which are the arguments usually applied when denying certain rights to some groups? This 
question can be researched from the perspective of arguments used to deny or withhold rights from certain groups (mi-
nority groups, vulnerable groups, groups on the basis of some ethical or religious characteristics). Then we can further ask, 
whether similar arguments are used to deny rights to animals. 
The author of this paper wishes to outline some approaches which render even the theoretical possibility of extending to 
animals some fundamental rights questionable: these are the legal personhood approach and the non-personal subjects 
approach.
25  right to food and water; right not to be tortured; right to be protected from disease and pain; right to express normal behaviour; right 
not to be subject to fear and distress.
26  New scientific evidence shows that animals can speak, make tools, transfer learned techniques, make tools and show compassion. 
Some animal communities clearly have a social structure and forms of communication, which may even surpass the communication 
techniques among humans. See for example Carl Safina, Beyond Words: What Animals Think and Feel, Henry Holt 2015. It seems to 
the author of this paper that even if the limit to which animals can reason and think has not been conclusively proven, at the same time 
there is sufficient argumentation to show that animals have the features of feeling and reasoning. 
27  Sally Engle Merry, Anthropology and International Law, Annual Review of Anthropology, 2006, 99 – 116.
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There is emerging literature on the question of whether animals should be granted “legal personhood”28. There are power-
ful non-governmental organisations, which claim the recognition of legal personhood of animals as their mission 29. This 
aspiration, albeit legally challenging to lawyers and animal rights activists, seems to downplay the stigma of a fundamental 
right which exists with or without the bearer of this right having legal personhood. The approach of setting a condition for 
any living being to be granted fundamental rights – that this being also has a full standing before the law – may have its 
roots in the Enlightenment’s understanding of morality being inseparable from legal personhood, but it does not seem to 
correspond to the contemporary understanding of human rights.
Beaudry concludes that the approach of seeking to grant some animals legal personhood is a dead end, which may succeed 
occasionally in separate court cases, but is not bound to overcome the theoretical barrier that legal personhood is insepa-
rable from human beings30.
The question of whether animals are comparable to a vulnerable group seems to not enter the discourse of lawyers and 
activists fighting for granting animals legal personhood. Rather, this approach seems to be based on the idea of a social 
contract stretched to encompass all living creatures. Like Christine Korsgaard has written, “We may demand that we not be 
tortured, injured, hunted, or eaten, not just because of the assault on our autonomous nature, but because of the assault on 
our animal nature; therefore we should not treat our fellow animals in those ways. Autonomy puts us in a position to make 
the demand, but it is not the reason for the demand.”31
Another approach, which, if realised, would mean almost a paradigmatic change in our understanding of fundamental 
rights, calls for a new category of non-personal subjects of law, which would overcome the dead end of the legal person-
hood concept. The authors of this proposition, Polish legal scholars Tomasz Pietrzykowski and Aleksandra Lis formulate 
this as follows, “The recognition of animals as non-personal subjects of the law entails making their vital interests legally 
relevant considerations that must be taken into account in all decisions that could materially impact their well-being. The 
obvious differences between human beings and non-human animals suggest that the latter should enjoy only one legal right 
– to have one’s individual, subjective interests taken into account whenever they may be seriously affected by decisions or 
actions of third persons. The concept of non-personal subjecthood avoids the obvious difficulties in attributing animals 
with the whole bundle of rights (most of which are bluntly inconsistent with the nature of even the most developed non-hu-
man animals) implicated by the ordinary concept of personhood in law.32”
When considering this proposition, one can ask whether there are fundamental differences between, from one side, the po-
sition that animals have only one right, e.g. to have their subjective interests taken into account when affected by decisions 
of third persons, and from the other side, with the approach there are certain vulnerable groups (young children, mentally 
disabled persons, old persons with dementia) that primarily have this same interest. Are there other criteria that need to be 
28  Jonas-Sebastien Beaudry, From Autonomy to Habeas Corpus: Animal Rights Activists Take the Parameters of Legal Personhood to 
Court,
29  For example, the US-based organisation the Nonhuman Rights Project (NHRP), which gives as its mission in its webpage, “Our 
mission is to change the legal status of appropriate nonhuman animals from mere ‘things’, which lack the capacity to possess any legal 
rights, to ‘persons’, who possess such fundamental rights as bodily integrity and bodily liberty” – see the website of NHRP at: www.
nonhumanrightsproject.org 
30  Baudry, p 31
31  Christine Korsgaard, Fellow creatures; Kantian ethics and our duties to animals, Tanner Lectures on Human Values 24, 100 – 101.
32  Aleksandra Lis and Tomasz Pietrzykowski, Animals as Objects of Ritual Slaughter: Polish Law after the Battle over Exceptionless 
Mandatory Stunning, Global Journal of Animal Law, 2/2015, 1 – 13, p 13.
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considered to distinguish such vulnerable groups other than their genetic code? If there are not, then we are close to a state 
where this new legal category, which the authors refer to, has some similarities with the doctrine of a vulnerable group33.
The author notes that both approaches are legal doctrines and have not used empirical evidence obtained via using socio-
logical methods in their argumentation. Perhaps this would even be difficult to imagine – how can you ask the population 
such a theoretical question, whether they think that animals should become legal persons, although the replies would be 
far-reaching. It might make much more sense to empirically study the question of whether the population views animals 
as a vulnerable group, because the categories used are far more understandable. The author of this article has come across 
a phenomenon of “human rights” language used towards animal suffering in judicial proceedings, which merits deeper 
research, but it has to remain for another article outside of the current one. When analysing recent Estonian court cases 
where animal cruelty was the subject matter, the author has come across many statements of charges where the prosecutor 
accuses the defendant of animal cruelty, causing the animal mental suffering. There is no mention of mental suffering as a 
qualifying criterion in respective Estonian penal legislation. Whenever someone causes another person mental suffering, 
consciously or not, this infringes on this person’s right not to be tortured or be subject to inhumane treatment. The latter is 
a fundamental right34. Causing an animal mental suffering means infringing on this animal’s right not to be subject to tor-
ture. It will be a challenge to study the reasons for the choice of words of these prosecutors when writing about the mental 
suffering causes of animals.
The question of vulnerability of animals in sociological and legal aspects
In order to test the hypothesis that the legal dynamics in the recognition of animals as a vulnerable group, thereby leading 
to the conversion of some fundamental rights to this vulnerable group, are comparable to the dynamics that have appeared 
in the past regarding other human vulnerable groups, two questions need to be addressed from the methodological per-
spective. The first question is whether animals are or should be viewed as having the characteristics of a distinctly vulner-
able (non-human) group. The second question is whether there are some similarities in the progressive recognition of the 
rights of the vulnerable groups in general (which then in turn needs to be applied to any vulnerable group), which can 
then be compared to the legal discourse around the rights of animals. The first question is mainly sociological and its study 
requires sociological methods. The second question includes both sociological and legal methods.
Traditionally, vulnerable groups include indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, refugees, migrant workers, women, chil-
dren, people with HIV/AIDS, persons with disabilities and older persons. There are various international legal instruments 
which protect these rights, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, or the Convention on all Forms of Discrim-
ination against Women.
It appears, however, that the concept of a vulnerable group within international human rights law has not been the subject 
of intense scholarly debates35. There seems to be some consensus that the concept of vulnerability is linked to the suscep-
tibility of harm. For example, Mary Neal writes, “Vulnerability speaks to our universal capacity for suffering, in two ways. 
First, I am vulnerable because I depend on the co-operation of others (including, importantly, the State) … Second, I am 
33  Although remaining outside of this article, the author points out that perhaps the non-personal subject of a legal approach can also 
be a tool for addressing the matter of recognising the fundamental rights of artificial intelligence.
34  Protected, for example, under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, article 3
35  See, for example, the analysis in: Lourdes Peroni and Alexandra Timmer, Vulnerable groups: The promise on an emerging convent 
in European Human Rights Convention law, International Journal of Constitutional Law (2013) 11, 1056 – 1085. With reference to the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the authors argue that the Court has only recently started to use the concept of 
a vulnerable group, originating from cases involving the Roma minority. 
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vulnerable because I am penetrable; I am permanently open and exposed to hurts and harms of various kinds.36” Regarding 
the term’s origin, it has been pointed out that it originates from the Latin word vulnus, meaning the “wound”37.
Within the discussion of vulnerability, the matter of suffering has special importance, since it has been used in the past to 
argue for the extension of fundamental rights to human vulnerable groups. The goal has been to universally recognise that 
these groups suffer and then find ways to eliminate the unnecessary suffering. 
At first glance, when relying on the matter of suffering, there is striking resemblance with some fundamental arguments 
which have been used to ask whether animals should be extended fundamental rights. Already in 1781, Jeremy Bentham 
introduced the idea that there is a moral dimension in the treatment of animals, his famous statement being in reference 
to animals, “The question is not, can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”38 Now, if one is judging on the 
basis of the ability of animals to suffer, then the questions of whether animals can be viewed as a distinct vulnerable group 
capable of having some fundamental rights extended to them is already answered in a positive manner. On the other hand, 
the ability to suffer can also be used in argumentation which does not necessarily lead to the acceptance of the proposition 
that animals should be accorded fundamental rights.
In the 1960s, the British Farm Animal Welfare Council formulated five freedoms for animals: freedom from hunger and 
thirst; freedom from discomfort; freedom from injury, pain and disease; freedom to express normal behaviour; freedom 
from fear and distress. (Comparable to the “four freedoms” formulated by F.D. Roosevelt in 1941: freedoms of speech and 
expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want, freedom from fear). The key concept of these freedoms is not that 
animals have rights, but the idea that animals should not be subject to unnecessary suffering. However, these freedoms 
would be close to rights, if they were accorded to animals. It seems that the watershed between a “freedom” and “right” is 
not something of substance, but rather linguistic expression of how the one asking the questions replies to the main issue 
– do animals have rights? It needs to be noted that the freedom to “live” (an animal’s right to life) is not mentioned among 
these freedoms. It can, therefore, be argued that animals are not protected because they have rights, but because humans 
recognise the duty to protect them because of ethical and perhaps economic reasons. The ethical reason here would be pri-
marily the need to avoid unnecessary suffering. The main research question in this context is somewhat “traditional”: are 
some animals protected in the contemporary society because they have rights, or because humans protect their own rights 
through the concept of animal welfare? This question can be viewed through concrete legal and social sub-questions. The 
media sometimes seems to devote more time to cruelty against animals than against humans, accompanied by public com-
passion exhibition. Is media doing this because it is concerned about the cruelty towards animals as such, or is it a concern 
about violence as an undesirable social phenomenon in general behind these reports? 
Be as it may, it seems that the concept of suffering by itself is not sufficient to guide one to the simple statement, “Animals 
can suffer, consequently, they need to be extended some fundamental rights with the view of averting the suffering”. How-
ever, at the same time it is also not sufficient to deny this conclusion.
The concept that animals are to be viewed as a distinct vulnerable group is gaining some recognition and theoretical back-
36  Mary Neal, Not Gods but Animals: Human Dignity and Vulnerable Subjecthood, Liverpool Law Review (2012), 177
37  Brian Turner, Vulnerability and Human Rights, Essays on Human Rights, Penn State University Press 2006.
38  It may be interesting to note that René Descartes was of the view that animals do not have a mind, and as a mind is necessary to feel 
pain, animals cannot feel pain.
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ing within the discussions of the overall concept of vulnerability. Martha Fineman has defined vulnerability as the possi-
bility of becoming dependent39. According to Fineman, a vulnerable subject may have episodic or permanent dependency 
on others, and the potential for dependency is universal40. Fineman believes that the current legal and social structures 
privilege individuals whose potential for vulnerability is not realised41. If applied to animals, it is easy to see that at least 
some animals are permanently dependent on humans. On the other hand, the majority of species do not depend on hu-
mans for their existence, as they live in the wild or in urban settings independently from humans. Arguing that only those 
animals who are vulnerable because of their dependency on humans for food and shelter are to be accorded fundamental 
rights might stretch the argument of vulnerability to a dead end. This line of thinking, if applied to Francione’s abolitionist 
position, would mean that at the very moment when animals are freed and they lose their dependence on humans, they 
consequently are no longer vulnerable and, therefore, lose their fundamental rights. Figuratively speaking, an ape escaping 
from the zoo with the slogan “Freedom!” would not be able to claim protection under the fundamental rights umbrella, 
since the ape is not dependent any longer and, consequently, not vulnerable. This leads to the argument that the doctrine 
of vulnerability, if applied to animals for arguing for their fundamental rights, must include some more basic elements than 
just material dependency for existence, as the latter can easily change. 
Martha Fineman has contrasted the typical association of vulnerability with victimhood, deprivation, dependency or pa-
thology to an understanding of vulnerability that reaches beyond the equal protection model42. For Fineman, vulnerability 
is different from dependency. Both are universal, but vulnerability is a constant, while inevitable dependency is episodic 
and sporadic.
Building on the vulnerability concept of Martha Fineman, Ani Satz has argued that the theory of animals as vulnerable sub-
jects is based on three premises. First, animal capacities for suffering are morally relevant. Second, she calls it ‘speciesist’ to 
privilege human over non-human suffering. Third, since humans and non-humans are universally vulnerable to suffering, 
their most basic capabilities must be treated equally43. Satz has been critical of all approaches advanced by legal scholars 
which address the dearth of protections for domestic animals44. She writes that these proposals “cannot overcome deeply 
entrenched inequalities in current law that result from legal gerrymandering or the hierarchy problem of human rights or 
interests being privileged over those of animals”.45 If Satz is right, then the only possibility to overcome these inequalities is 
to recognise that animals have fundamental rights, as this would eliminate the hierarchy problem. The same fundamental 
rights cannot have more weight towards a certain category of right-holders in comparison with other categories.
The author finds it established that the proposition that animals can be viewed as a distinct vulnerable group cannot be 
excluded on the basis of the criteria frequently used for determining the main characteristics of a vulnerable group (ability 
for suffering, need to be taken care of). The research needs to focus further on establishing whether there may be some 
common features in the scholarly understanding of the concept of vulnerability which may preclude identifying animals 
39  Martha Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 Yale J.L. and Feminism 1 (2008), at 9 – 10.
40  Ibid.
41  Ibid, at 13 - 14
42  Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 2o Yale J.L. and Feminism 1, 2008 
– 2009, at 8 - 9
43  Ani B. Satz, Animals as vulnerable subjects: beyond interest-convergence, hierarchy, and property, Animal Law, vol 16:2, 2009, 1 - 5014
44  Such as changing the legal status of animals from property to persons, or altering the allowable uses of animals regardless their clas-
sification as property.
45  Satz, 36 - 37
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as a vulnerable group46.
The research question that needs also methodological focus is, thus, whether there is something in the various concepts of 
vulnerability which may preclude considering animals a distinct vulnerable group. 
The author wishes to outline two distinct concepts: the capabilities approach and the idea of the progressive development 
of fundamental rights.
Martha Nussbaum has introduced the capabilities approach to justice for animals, which calls to find out which capabil-
ities humans and animals share. The capabilities approach, according to Nussbaum, is based on the idea of a basic social 
minimum focusing on human capabilities, of what people are actually able to do and to be – in a way informed by an in-
tuitive idea of a life that is worthy of the dignity of the human being.47 When applied to animals, this approach focuses on 
the questions of what animals are capable of doing and which rights need to be protected in order to protect their existence. 
As such, it seems that the capabilities approach does not exclude the gradual expansion of fundamental rights to animals. 
Martha Nussbaum herself is an advocate of the approach of giving animals the protection of some fundamental rights. 
Within this debate, Martha Nussbaum has argued that the most appropriate method to distinguish between species is the 
so-called “species norm”, with a view to which species have opportunities to flourish.
Amartya Sen has developed the capabilities approach from a somewhat different perspective than Martha Nussbaum, 
avoiding the idea that certain universally accepted principles need to be advanced through any set of capabilities, such as 
the principle of human dignity. He defines the capabilities approach as enabling certain outcomes achievable through hu-
man rights law, which depend on an individual’s biology and other limitations.48
Satz writes about the Equal Protection of Animals (the EPA approach), which combines vulnerability and capability theory 
and the principle of equal protection49. Satz is, of course, aware of the possible criticism to this paradigmatic change propo-
sition, leading her to conclude that the realisation of the EPA approach creates a presumption against animal use50, possibly 
challenging the idea of animals as consumption for food51. Satz does not, surprisingly, argue for a differentiated application 
of the EPA approach, where domestic animals would have the entitlement to equal protection and others not.
46  A dilemma may, of course, emerge if we imagine that international law would indeed recognise some animals (great apes, the dol-
phins, the whales, the pets) as having certain unalienable fundamental rights, such as the right to life. Notwithstanding that it might 
effectively lead to the abolition of whaling rights, situations may also emerge when the rights of an animal as part of a vulnerable group 
need to be balanced against other rights. Vulnerability per se is a criterion which gives the subject relatively more weight than to an-
other subject with no such pre-condition. What if great apes were extended fundamental rights, such as the right to life, and in a zoo a 
grown-up suddenly appeared in the cage of the great ape? Today most zoos would not hesitate to shoot the great ape, if there was reason 
to believe that the person’s life may be in danger. But if this great ape had a fundamental right to life, then strictly taken in a balancing 
exercise this ape’s rights would have more weight than the right to life of a grown-up man, who by his own fault appeared in his cage. 
Would the zookeepers refrain from intervention then?
47  Martha Nussbaum, Women and Development. The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge University Press 2000, p 5
48  Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in: The Quality of Life 31 (Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, editors, Clarendon Press 
1993), at 318
49  Satz, 40
50  Ibid
51  The EPA approach calls for the realisation of rights among all animals to have necessary food and hydration, maintain bodily integ-
rity, be sheltered, exercise and engage in natural behaviours of movement, and experience companionship
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A novel aspect in the concept of vulnerability seems to be its gradual expansion, for example, Martha Fineman has written 
that vulnerability “presents opportunities for innovation and growth, creativity, and fulfilment. It makes us reach to oth-
ers, form relationships, and build institutions.52” Here is yet another similarity with animals and also with the capabilities 
approach.
We may, perhaps surprisingly, find the endorsement of the capabilities approach also from European “blue-sky” constitu-
tional rights research. When writing about the justification of human rights, Robert Alexy has listed one among the eight 
justifications an explicative justification, which consists of an analysis of the discursive practice of asserting, asking and 
arguing53. According to Alexy, this explicative argument leads only to freedom and equality as capabilities or possibilities54. 
For the purposes of this article, this opens an approach that once capabilities are instrumental in the construction of funda-
mental rights, it is not dependent on who the holder of these capabilities is. This then means that the capabilities approach 
per se does not exclude the view that animals are holders of fundamental rights.
Another legal concept is the one of the progressive development of human rights55, which argues that human rights have 
gradually been expanded to encompass different vulnerable groups, which originally did not receive the benefit of such 
rights. In the event of a progressive rights development, who are the actors that are best positioned to decide on the scope 
and nature of a new rights56? Are these international courts, national or political institutions or civil society organisations? 
The answer seems to be that there is a variety of factors. Fundamentally, the context of the progressive development of hu-
man rights also touches the issue of whether the global society is currently witnessing the emergence of new human rights, 
or whether they are just a reflection of the need to highlight some specific aspect of a particular right? If the latter is correct, 
then we need to say that progressive development in the context of animals is indicative of the process by which certain 
existing rights are extended beyond the threshold of humans.
Both of these approaches lead to conclude that vulnerable groups have been gradually extended the protection of various 
fundamental rights. If animals can be viewed as a vulnerable group, then perhaps this logic is also applicable towards them. 
However, none of these approaches distinctly make the latter argument.
CONCLUSION
When reviewing the article before commencing on the conclusion part, the author noticed something which had remained 
somewhat hidden when writing. This is the frequency of the term ‘paradigm’ in various settings. Martha Fineman uses the 
‘paradigm’ language when writing about the vulnerability approach in addressing material and social inequalities. Anne 
Peters refers to the need for paradigmatic changes at the global level on the question of why animal rights need to be pro-
tected, leading to a revolutionary change. The Equal Protection of Animals approach, if realised to the full, inevitably will 
lead to a presumption against all animal use, which Satz refers to as a paradigmatic change. Helen Nissenbaum’s contextual 
integrity theory, which is applicable to all people and societies, means a paradigmatic change in the way we understand 
what privacy is. This implies that the notion of privacy is not species-dependent, but context-dependent, opening the door 
52  Martha Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of Individual and Societal Responsibility, The Elder Law Journal 
2012, p 126
53  Robert Alexy, “The Existence of Human Rights”, in: Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, supplementary volume 136 
(2013), 13 - 18
54  Ibid.
55  David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem? Harvard Human Rights Journal (2002), 
56  Alan Boyle, Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment. Fordham Environmental Law Review (2007), 471 - 511
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for fundamental rights protection of animals. Tomasz Pietrzykowski and Aleksandra Lis have formulated a non-personal 
subjects approach, which, if realised, again means a paradigmatic change of our understanding of fundamental rights – that 
there are hierarchies within the fundamental rights system based on the subject of the rights holder. Therefore, one conclu-
sion from this paradigm ‘language’ is that the current theoretical and legal approaches to animals and fundamental rights 
are neither satisfactory to the scholarly, nor to the stakeholder community. When a critical mass of informed colleagues 
continues to write about the need for a paradigmatic change, then this change will eventually happen, yet it is not possible 
to ascertain what will be the main characteristics of the new paradigm in reference to animals and fundamental rights.
 
The author has demonstrated in the article, on the one hand, a consensual agreement with the proposition that animals 
deserve more protection, yet, on the other hand, there is a lack of consensus on the question of exactly why and how. The 
question of justifiability is crucial for the discussion to go one way or another: if there is a reasonable justification for why 
animals should have fundamental rights, this will sooner or later also be recognised in global human rights law. If there 
is no such justification, then animal welfare legislation will be the ceiling of legal protection, unless some circumstances 
should change substantially. 
Within the search of a proper doctrinal basis for arguing whether (some) animals should be given (some) fundamental 
rights, the concept of vulnerability has escaped comprehensive sociological and legal analysis. This approach is primarily 
originating from feminist studies. There are no studies focusing on the question of how the general population would re-
act to the question of granting animals fundamental rights. Such a study would need to have an aspect of dynamics – e.g. 
whether the attitudes are changing over time. It also seems that most scholars are avoiding the question of vulnerability of 
animals – this is not a deliberate decision, but the question of vulnerability simply remains outside of their focus. However, 
there are some authors who consider that especially the question of vulnerability may hold an answer to the question of 
whether at some point in the future there may be a growing consensus on the need to extend some fundamental rights to 
animals. To put it differently, if the concept of animals as a vulnerable group cannot be advocated from both the sociologi-
cal and legal perspective, then the possibility of extending some fundamental rights to animals may fail. In the view of the 
author, the task of legal and social scholars has a clear moral dimension here – to describe theoretically a more harmonious 
society, where different species co-exist without causing one another more than just minimal harm, and thereafter attempt 
to “translate” the theory into concrete normative protection.
